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A Comment on Property and Divorce
CAROL WEISBROD*
This comment responds to the broadest reading of Professor Wil-
liams's paper, one in which she invites us to consider large relationships
between property and the law of marriage and divorce.'
Professor Williams has suggested that we focus on ways to create a
wife's entitlement to the future income of her former husband. Essentially,
this entitlement is grounded in a combination of factors ranging from in-
vestment, to contribution, to expectations, to need, as well as to some idea
of justice. An entitlement for women is needed to rectify an existing ine-
quality resulting from our wage-labor system. Professor Williams argues,
in effect, that in the context of post-divorce property division and alimony
arrangements, we should move from a family law system based on discre-
tion to a system that gives women a property-based entitlement equivalent
to that presently held by husband wage-earners.
Passing the argument that there is likely to be discretion in all areas of
law, including property, the more fundamental observation here is that Pro-
fessor Williams's idea may be as much about entitlement as about prop-
erty. Entitlements can be created in a variety of ways, including contracts
and other instruments in commercial law. Creating a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship and moving into the field of creditor's rights is a possibility?
Contracts generally are a source of obligation and, thus, entitlement. In
addition, property ideas may be useful.
More broadly, however, property in its larger history may have some-
thing to contribute to the discussion which is unique to property because of
its long-standing connection to family law and to the shape of the family.
While some of the current conversation suggests that there is something
new in considering property and family law together, it seems that when
one takes the long view, these fields are closer than one might think.
* Ellen Ash Peters Professor University of Connecticut School of Law. This text Is an edited
version of a talk given at the 1999 Gallivan Conference, commenting on Joan Williams's paper.
1. See Joan Williams, Do fives Own Half? Winning for Jfies After Wcndt, 32 CONN. L REV.
249(1999).
2. Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Mork
Through PremaritalSecurity Agreements, 77 TEX L. REV. 17 (1998).
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A large focus of the history of the law of the family was once prop-
erty.3 This is evident in Pollock and Maitland. The theme is also pursued
in the work of Julius Goebel, who remarked, "as Karl Marx very clearly
noticed, there has always been an interdependence of family and prop-
erty.' 4 When, in 1946, Goebel included a section on family law in his
Cases and Materials on the Development of Legal Institutions, he produced
a table of contents that reads-at least in the section on the common law
and the family-like the outline of the first semester of a standard property
course.
This may surprise us because in recent decades family law has often
been focused on conflicts of laws and, later, on issues of psychology and
the integration of this field with the social sciences. Leading examples of
such writings have, for example, focused on the welfare of children using
social science perspectives.
As to the issue of family law and women, one might say that it has
been conventional for decades that the subject is of special concern to
women. But where family law once meant something about a description
of the condition of women-a description written largely by men relatively
satisfied with what they saw-to the extent that it deals with women now,
it more and more opens questions about structural tensions between the
family and the outside environment. Professor Williams's work has dem-
onstrated its explicit connection to some of these tensions and issues in
property. Professor Williams and others have also raised basic questions
about the meaning of property. These questions are as radical as those
traditionally posed by Marxist and Utopian thinkers.
We may also say, however, that there are significant differences in the
fields of property and family law. One difference might be the time frame.
At the risk of overstatement, I suggest this contrast. We often see family
law as dealing with people in immediate crisis, as picking up the pieces of
an urgent problem. Property, by contrast, is often focused on advanced
planning. We look at people who have taken a long view forward-the
control of the dead hand, for example-into the remote future and the field
responds in terms that reflect that long view. The Rule Against Perpetui-
ties acknowledges and attacks the explicit attempt to control the remote
future. And the language of property describes the subjects of the field in
terms that suggest the weight of continuities: ancestral lands and dynastic
wealth. Stressing the historical aspects of the subject, we often teach prop-
erty beginning with feudalism, one of the conditions-like "barbarism,"
"tribalism," and recently, "liberalism"---in which people are said to be
3. These paragraphs are adapted from Carol Weisbrod, Susanna and the Elders: A Note on the
Regulation of Families, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 271,288.
4. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
442 (1946).
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"mired." When family law reaches issues as long term as these, we often
say, "Oh that is for another course--trusts and estates perhaps, or wills."
But the emphasis on feudalism carries a subtext to the effect that the
system of estates and the functions it served are obsolete and of historical
interest only, if that. We might, therefore, remind ourselves that Alice
James inherited a life estate in a shawl.5 We might further consider some
of the actual functions of the old system and raise the following question:
What legal structures are available today to perform such functions?
Recalling what we once knew about feudal estates, we quote such
forms as, "A and the Heirs of his Body." The formula creates an entail in
favor of one generation and then the next, indefinitely.6 Over time, the
entail could be broken by certain processes-for example, making the land
alienable-which was, in any case, largely abolished in the United States.
It did survive, however, in some states. Raised in Maine, the poet
Edna St. Vincent Millay seems to have been acquainted with the entail.
She described the feudal estate in a late poem:
Those hours when happy hours were my estate,--
Entailed, as proper, for the next in line,
Yet mine the harvest, and the title mine-...
The powerful link between family and property continues; some of it is
analyzed in terms of human capital, some is seen as involving more tradi-
tional forms of transfer. The recent changes in family wealth transmission
and the inter vivos transaction have been discussed. Langbein writes:
My first theme . . . concerns human capital. Whereas of old,
5. See JEAN STROUSE, ALICE JAMES: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (1980) ("'A life interest in a shawl ...
IV]ith a reversion to a mate heir, is so extraordinary and ludicrous a bequest that I can hardly think it
could have been seriously meant.'").
6. For the history of the entail, we go back before the medieval statute De Donis. De Donis abol-
ished the fee simple conditional and created the fee tail. "Entailed as Proper" for the next in line, and
the next, and the next.
7. EDNA ST. VINCENT MILLAY, MINE THE HARVEST: A COLLECTION OFNE PoEMS 121 (1954).
The poem continues:
Those acres, fertile, and the furrow straight,
From which the lark would rise-all of my late
Enchantments, still, in brilliant colours, shine,
But striped with black, the tulip, lawn and vine,
Like gardens looked at through an iron gate.
Yet not as one who never sojoumed there
I view the lovely segments of a past
I lived with all my senses, well aware
That this was perfect, and it would not last:
I smell the flower, though vacuum-still the air,
I feel its texture, though the gate is fast.
1999]
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wealth transmission from parents to children tended to center upon
major items of patrimony such as the family farm or the family
firm, today for the broad middle classes, wealth transmission cen-
ters on a radically different kind of asset: the investment in skills.
In consequence, intergenerational wealth transmission no longer
occurs primarily upon the death of the parents, but rather, when the
children are growing up, hence, during the parents' lifetimes.8
There is also a certain amount of wealth transmission after the children are
grown up and in the lifetime of the parents.
The connection between family and property may hold even in family
law cases which are apparently not about property at all. Consider, for
example, the famous conflicts case, In re May's Estate,9 about the validity
in New York of an uncle/niece marriage celebrated in Rhode Island."
While the case is formally about the conflicts rules relating to the recogni-
tion of marriages, the underlying issue seems to have been about prop-
erty." I
In the case of divorce, property issues are not, of course, the whole
story. Despite all of our efforts, divorces cannot really be described as
"messy." Our language continues to be intense, focused on pain, loss, and,
in the more neutral idiom of contracts, on defeated expectations. We are
ordinarily concerned with the couple and the children of the couple, but
perhaps we should also look at the defeated expectations of an older gen-
eration-the grandparents, the testators of the inheritances and donors of
the gifts which are, in many cases, by one route or another, part of the
marital assets available for distribution.
12
The expectations of the older generation may be defeated in general as
well as in specific ways. The most general issue can be put in U.C.C.
terms: a high divorce rate involves loss of "a continuing sense of... secu-
8. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REv. 722,723 (1988).
9. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
10. See id
1 I. See id. This is suggested in the respondent's brief.
In 1946, the wife died intestate. She left surviving her a husband (the respondent
herein), and six children of this marriage, all of whom were adults. The petitioner is one of
these children. Six years after the death of her mother, the said daughter, as petitioner, filed
this application for Letters of Administration in an effort to prevent her father from dispos-
ing of real property owned by her father and mother by the entirety. The petitioner leases
one of the two apartments existing on this property. Her father occupies the other.
The procedural device used by this daughter-appellant herein-is solely a means by
which the Court may determine the validity of the marriage of her parents and consequently
the prospective property rights of the child as against the father. The petitioner is joined by
two of her sisters. The father is supported by his two sons and the remaining daughter.
Respondents' Brief at 3, In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
12. The grandparents also enter the story when they ask for visitation rights or when they need
support. They are described as grandparents in a full generational account. Using a more restricted
lens, they are parents of adult children.
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rity." 13 It is as much about Thanksgiving dinners and the individual iden-
tity as existing within a particular family constellation as it is about care-
taking in old age. Parents and children are still parents and children even
when they are adults, and even when they are aged adults.
The available models of relationship here seem more various than the
models for parents of young children, or spousal relations. Cross cultur-
ally, variations are common in inter-generational arrangements and also
with respect to in-law relations.
Some people expect to add in-law apartments to their homes. Others
do not. Some people expect to support parents and other extended family.
Others do not. Some grandparents feel the need to pass property-not hu-
man capital-through the blood line. Others do not To the extent that
more variation is seen as acceptable, more systems for property arrange-
ments may also be needed.
The older and obsolete mechanisms of future interests allowed many
arrangements-many "preferences," one might say. Some of these are
now problematic because of our emphasis on the couple and on the indi-
vidual affective relationship of the couple. The notion of divestment on
failure to meet a condition, for example, is viewed with hostility. 4 We see
the over controlling dead hand. But, clearly, land could be used as mecha-
nism for the enforcement of particular family values. The sanction was not
prison but divestment
Millay's poem is evocative of divestment.15 The estate here is not,
apparently, an ordinary life estate, passing at the death of the present
owner. Rather, we see a former owner divested of the estate and excluded
from it.
Examples from the Restatement of Property illustrate such divest-
ments.
A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, transfers Blackacre
"to B for life or so long as B shall remain chaste." The language
"so long as B shall remain chaste" is a special limitation. B has a
determinable estate for life.' 6
13. See UC.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1.
14. See RESTATEMENT (rID) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. a, at 53 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999) C I]he
commentary here takes positions more restrictive with respect to certain types of trust provisions than
the positions presently taken in some of the rules of Part III ofDivision I of Restatement Second, Prop-
erty."). Discussing this issue in 1977, Gareth Jones (of Trinity College, Cambridge) suggested tha- the
courts should hesitate to strike down restraints wich they find offensive to public policy before deter-
mining, through empirical studies, how "prevalent and influential the so called offensive restraints are."
Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of T7uhL, In DEAnr, TAX=S AND FAMNLY PROPERTY
119, 129 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). It is entirely possible that the legal systems of different
countries will see these problems differently.
15. See MILLAY, supra note 7, at 121. Millay's poem is built on a lost estate, a thing that w-s
perfect and could not last. See id.
16. RESTATEMENT (FsRT) OF PROPERTY § 23 illus. 1, at 55 (1936).
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X, wherein Blackacre is located, permits the creation of an estate
in fee tail. A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, transfers
Blackacre "to B and the heirs male of his body so long as he and
they continue as members of the Catholic Church." B has a deter-
minable estate in fee tail male. A has a reversion.
7
The world of the feudal estates provided a model for the maintenance
of a set of values and institutions, including the family.
As indicated, the present understanding of marriage as a union of two
loving individuals makes such provisions insulting. Moreover, wealth is
no longer necessarily land, which ideally must be kept intact, but simply
capital, which can be divided, used, and, in a consumption-oriented world,
dissipated. And often whatever accumulation there is might not be called
wealth in any case and will often be consumed in the form of annuities,
exhausted by the time of the death of the oldest generation.
And yet the sense of collective ownership does not go away. In the
novel Le Divorce, the property (a painting) is described by the wife's fam-
ily as belonging to more people than the wife.18 In some cases, the holders
of the property may see their connection in terms of stewardship more than
ownership. The restraint on alienation is psychological and not legal; or,
seen through another optic, it becomes a "law" of the family.
The present highly individualistic focus in legal materials sees the is-
sue in terms of the rights of the individual grantor. He can do a great many
things, including disinherit his children. What he does may limit the rights
of an individual grantee-for example:
When a testator attempts to use his power to dispose of his prop-
erty in such a way as to exert pressure on a legatee to conform to
some religious preference of the testator, the stage would seem to
be set for potential conflict between two fundamental policies of
our legal system: freedom of testation and freedom of religion. 9
As in other cases, we do not ask how the preference is formed or how this
expression of the preference is related to other expressions of a similar
position. We do not explore the issues of identity or group membership to
which the preference may relate.
But this leaves a problem. How does a property scheme which is de-
signed to protect long term interests survive a divorce regime focused on
the immediate needs of a nuclear family? In some versions of the divorce
distribution scheme, states will protect a "separate property" if it remains
separate. But, of course, separate property may become marital property.
17. Id. at § 23 illus. 7, at 58.
18. See DIANE JOHNSON, LEDIVORCE 191 (1997).
19. Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Testamentary Conditions: The Principle of Uncertainty and Religion, 18
ST. Louis U. L.J. 563, 581-82 (1974).
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A recent casebook reviews the point:
If, for example, one spouse receives a gift of money during mar-
riage from a parent and deposits it into a bank account where she
also deposits her earnings, the gift will likely become hopelessly
mixed, or "commingled" with marital assets and, as a result, be
treated as marital property.... Or, if the money is deposited in a
joint account, in many states a presumption will arise that the
owner intended to make a gift to the marital estate and the funds
will be "transmuted" from separate to marital property. °
And one can easily imagine a system in which any property acquired dur-
ing marriage from any source will be available for distribution.
2 1
This is more than an issue for the very rich. Many people want to give
money or particular things whether or not of extrinsic value, within the
blood line or within the group z2
It may be that the older generation, having had notice and experience
of the changes consequent on no-fault divorce, is taking steps to counteract
its effects on inter vivos gifts.23 Perhaps inter vivos gifts are made directly
to grandchildren, or perhaps gifts are made on conditions, or later rather
than earlier. (Some cases on their facts might seem to raise the issue of
when a marriage vests.)24 Perhaps there is less inter-generational transfer
altogether. It may be that there is information available on such patterns-
the responses to the shattering of expectations in the older generation
which free divorce has produced. But if such information exists, I am not
familiar with it. It may be that we have not yet analyzed the ways in which
20. FAMILY LAw 728 (Harty D. Krause et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). A similar problem may arise in
the context of the death of a spouse. Thus, in Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966),
where the grandparents (parents of a deceased daughter) fought the widower-husband for custody of his
son, the court refers to the husband's dissipation of the grandparents' gift of money to the daughter,
which she (and they?) had intended for the child's education. See ld at 155.
21. Contractual arrangements and rearrangements are possible, of course.
22. Professor Lewis M. Simes writes:
It must not be supposed that the future interest and the rules of law which restrict it can be
understood outside its natural setting. That setting is the family settlement,--the disposi-
tions, whether by will or inter vivos, by which the man of property attempts to tie up his es-
tate in the family.
LEwis M. SIMEs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS 3 (2d ed. 1966) (emphasis added).
He then adds a footnote:
Professor Leach, in the preface to his casebook on Wilts (2d ed., 1947). p. iv, referring to
the course "which bears the unfortunate label 'Future Interests'," says: "it ought to be called
something like 'The Substance of Gift Transactions, Testamentary and Inter Vivos, for Cli-
ents above the Shoe-Sales-man Income Level.'"
Id. at 3 nA. "Above the Shoe-Sales-man Income Level" includes a great many people.
23. This point was suggested during a class on Family Law in spring. 1999.
24. See Litteral v. Litteral, Ill S.W. 872, 873 (Mo. App. 1908) (involving the conflict between a
young widow and her deceased husband's family of origin).
1999]
those inter vivos transactions may have changed 2s in response to divorce
and the new approaches to economic arrangements after divorce. It would
seem to be a good subject for empirical research.
The field of property suggests various ways of arranging things as to
these issues as well as a vocabulary in which to address them. We might
try to reopen the story of free alienation of land associated with individu-
alism to pick up the strands, the "segments of a past" as Millay wrote,26
which stressed the continuities of families, and groups. Professor Williams
has argued the connection between property ideas and divorce in a way
which focuses on the children and the couple. In urging the importance of
the property connection, she has directed our attention to issues that are of
continuing significance in a variety of contexts. Herbert Wechsler noted
some time ago to the "impingement of the law of property on human inter-
ests of the first importance." 2 This comment has simply offered some
illustrations of this point.
25. Are down payments on a house given or withheld? Is money put into accounts for a grand-
child? Or is assistance given for repayment of a student loan of a son or daughter (rather than a down
payment)?
26. MILLAY, supra note 7, at 121.
27. Herbert Weschler, Forward to I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY at vii (1983).
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